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On Location Privacy in LTE Networks
John D. Roth, Member, IEEE, Murali Tummala, Senior Member, IEEE, John C. McEachen, Member, IEEE,
and James W. Scrofani, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract— Location privacy is an ever increasing concern as
the pervasiveness of computing becomes more ubiquitous. This
is especially apparent at the intersection of privacy, convenience,
and quality of service in cellular networks. In this paper, we show
the long term evolution (LTE) signaling plane to be vulnerable
to location-based attacks via the timing advance (TA) parameter.
To this end, we adapt the Cramér-Rao lower bound for timing
advance-based estimation and show the associated estimator
to be efficient. The analysis is complemented with numerical
studies that feature synthetic and real-world data collected in
existing LTE network deployments. Additionally, the Cellular
Synchronization Assisted Refinement algorithm, a method of
TA-based attack augmentation is examined. We show how it
can simultaneously improve location resolution and negate the
effects of poor network infrastructure geometry. The analysis
and simulation demonstrate that a localization attack can yield
resolution as high as 40 m.
Index Terms— Maximum-likelihood estimation, Cramér-Rao
bound, position measurement, time of arrival estimation, cellular
networks, privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
PRIVACY is a historically polarizing subject. On one hand,it is an internationally recognized fundamental human
right [1]. On the other hand, there is a movement that does
not recognize this right or at a minimum advocates for
something less than absolute privacy [2]–[4]. At the very least,
this binary climate offers the observation that as technology
becomes more ubiquitous, privacy becomes more obscure in
implementation and less axiomatic. Privacy can be subdivided
in many different ways. However, in this work we focus specif-
ically on location privacy, which Beresford and Stajano define
as [5] “…the ability to prevent other parties from learning
one’s current or past location.” Indeed, it may be that the
benefit of convenience outweighs public concerns of location
privacy or that many are not even aware of this niche privacy
sub-genre. Several studies have noted a lack of awareness or
indifference toward location-based privacy [6]–[9].
Making location privacy an especially difficult subject to
understand is that it is nuanced in implementation. Primarily
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of note is that location privacy and the accuracy of the
position estimate are inextricably linked [10]. They are at least
inversely proportional in the sense that as the accuracy of
location information on an individual increases that person’s
privacy decreases by at least the same amount. No where
is this more apparent than in cellular networks. With more
individuals than ever joining the ever-expanding Long Term
Evolution (LTE) network [11] the protocol bears a signifi-
cant level of responsibility in protecting its users’ privacy.
While the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has
made steps to improve older standards, such as the Universal
Telecommunications System, in order to better protect users’
privacy [12] the evolution of the protocol has opened new
vulnerabilities specifically in the area of location privacy.
The main contribution of this work is to show the LTE
signaling plane to be vulnerable to location-based attack
through statistically rigorous analysis. Specifically, we will use
the timing advance (TA), an LTE signaling plane parameter,
as a mechanism for exploitation. Additionally, we highlight
architectural shifts from previous cellular protocols that make
LTE vulnerable to this type of attack and outline how with
minimal equipment and expertise a location-based attack could
be made even more potent. The analysis is complemented with
numerical studies that feature synthetic and real-world data
collected in existing LTE networks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, related work is discussed and contrasted with
this investigation. In Section III, the TA is formally introduced
and presented in context of the LTE network protocol. Due
to the extensive use of acronyms throughout this work we
also include Table I in this section to help guide the reader.
In Section IV, the theory of quantization of a random vari-
able (RV) is reviewed before it is applied specifically to the
TA in Section V. Also in this section, a lower bound and
maximum-likelihood estimate (MLE) for the position estimate
are derived. Next, a method of position estimate augmentation,
Cellular Synchronzation Assisted Refinement (CeSAR), is
reviewed in Section VI. The results of numerical studies
which compliment the previous analysis are then presented
in Section VII and strategies for mitigating the location-based
vulnerability in LTE are suggested in Section VIII. Finally, we
make our concluding remarks in Section IX.
II. PRIOR ART
Previous work relevant to the present subject fall into two
categories: parameter estimation of quantized random data
and TA-based positioning.
In the former category, significant efforts have been made
to establish a stochastic theory of quantization [13]–[16].
U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright.
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Sheppard’s correction [17] is an oft-cited, albeit sometimes
misunderstood, calculation that has been invoked to justify the
contribution of quantization to the latent variable’s moments.
As pointed out in [18] and explored in this paper, quantization
can also lower data variance. Additionally, efforts in the appli-
cation of this theory have been applied largely to amplitude
quantization of signals [19]–[22].
A logical application of quantization estimation theory will
also necessarily include a discussion of a lower bound for such
estimation [20], [21], [23]. These forays usually include an
exact result that is fairly cumbersome to calculate [23]. In the
present work we build on these results to establish an intuitive
approach to relating a well-known lower bound for continuous-
time signals to quantized data. We also extend work done on
quantization in amplitude to quantization in distance.
Similarly, TA-based positioning is well-traveled in the liter-
ature. These investigations began with the advent of the Global
System for Mobile Communications (GSM), which famously
used the TA parameter [24], [25]. However, timing synchro-
nization was not as strict in GSM, and an estimated TA accu-
racy of 550 to 2,200 meters [25] likely dissuaded many from
pursuing the topic further. Tentative steps were taken to try to
average multiple TA measurements to improve accuracy [26]
or to use the parameter for other applications such as traffic
state estimation [27], but it never achieved much traction.
It was not until the birth of LTE, which promised tighter
timing requirements (resulting in better spatial resolution)
that the TA as a location mechanism was reopened in the
literature. Indeed is it suggested as a parameter for use
in the LTE Positioning Protocol (LPP) [28] and has been
invoked with some success in applications such as assisting in
positioning [29] and proximity discovery in device to device
implementations [30]. However, the use of real-world data is
noticeably absent from the literature, as is any effort to validate
simulation models against actual network deployments. To our
knowledge, Hiltunen et al. [31] are the only researchers who
have published results from LTE real-world data. However,
they made no effort to characterize the data, instead opting to
use it, similar to its function in LPP, as an additional dimension
in a radio fingerprint database.
The idea of TA-based positioning refinement was first intro-
duced in [32]. This idea of refinement was later applied to field
measurements in [33] and [34]. We build on this body of work
by presenting an updated analysis. The analysis provides a
robust justification for a lower bound on the expected accuracy
of the method. Further, numerical studies are used to highlight
how the refinement method has a secondary benefit of negating
effects of poor enhanced Node B (eNB) geometry. Finally,
we introduce field data associated with the refinement method
previously synthesized in simulation.
Adding to the significant body of literature on TA-based
positioning we show how, in LTE, the TA is particularly
vulnerable to attack. We further demonstrate its vulnerability
with real-world data collected from existing LTE network
deployments.
III. MORPHOLOGY OF THE LTE TIMING ADVANCE
PARAMETER
In this section we present a review of the LTE standard
with the aim of presenting the structure and relationship of the
TA to the protocol at large. Its operation in current (legacy)
network deployments and future (heterogeneous) deployments
are discussed.
A. The Timing Advance in Legacy Networks
The TA is a signaling plane parameter with the purpose
of reconciling user equipment (UE) mobility with quality of
service. LTE uses an orthogonal-frequency-division multiple
access (OFDMA) scheme which requires transmissions to be
highly disciplined in time and frequency in order to avoid
intersymbol interference with other UEs sharing service to the
same eNB [35]. As UEs move throughout a serving cell their
distance to the serving eNB may change thus changing the
propagation delay between the UE and the eNB. The eNB
constantly estimates the eNB distance and issues frequent TA
updates in order to ensure the UE is continuously synchronized
by compensating for the propagation delay.
The TA takes two main forms in normal operation. The first
occurs when a user initially negotiates access to a eNB. During
negotiation the UE will receive from the eNB a random access
response (RAR) message which will contain several key pieces
of information among which is the TA. In this form, the TA is
an 11-bit quantity TA ∈ [0, . . . , 1282] [36]. The second form
of the TA is used for maintenance of an existing connection.
This value is relative and makes adjustments based on the
current state of the TA. This version of the TA is found in a
medium access control (MAC) layer control element (CE) and
is a six-bit quantity TA ∈ [0, . . . , 63] [36].
Whether issued during initial access or as a maintenance
command, the TA is a discrete quantity thus limiting its
resolution in time. Specifically, each TA unit advises the
UE to advance or retard its transmissions by 16 × TA × Ts
seconds, where Ts is the sampling period given by Ts =
(15, 000× 2048)−1. The calculation of Ts is a function of the
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subcarrier spacing (15 kHz) and the Fast Fourier transform size
(2048) [37], [38]. Because the TA directly corresponds to the
propagation delay between the UE and the eNB this value can
be easily exploited to estimate the UE distance to the eNB, d̂,
via a combination of already introduced relationships viz.
d̂ = 16× 1
2
× c
15000× 2048 × TA (1)
where c is the speed of light and the extra factor of 1/2
is included to take into account round-trip time. By setting
TA = 1 it can be verified from (1) that the TA resolution in
distance is 78.125 meters [39].
The frequency with which this value is updated is lower
bounded by a parameter called the timeAlignmentTimer
which is configurable by the individual network
operator. Possible values of this timer include
{500, 750, 1280, 1920, 2560, 5120, 10249,∞} [40]. These
values each represent the maximum number of subframes that
can pass without receiving a TA. Because the subframe time
is 1 ms in LTE, these values can be seen as the maximum
number of milliseconds that can pass before a TA must be
reissued, even if there is no change in the TA value [37].
Assuming the network chooses only finite values, at worst it
can be assumed that a TA will be issued at least once every
10 seconds. At best the network will issue at least two TAs
every second. It should also be noted that this is only a lower
bound. In field measurements we have observed much higher
frequencies of TA issuance. Also, because the purpose of the
TA is to maintain time alignment it can be expected that a
highly mobile UE will receive more TAs than one that is
stationary.
Finally, we note that the TA is passed as a message in the
MAC sublayer which sits below the packet data convergence
protocol (PDCP) sublayer [35]. Because the PDCP sublayer
is solely responsible for encryption, the TA is sent in the
clear [41]. This is a significant shift in security architec-
ture from GSM in which these parameters would be sent
encrypted [42].
B. The Timing Advance in Heterogeneous Networks
Each MAC CE has two bits reserved for future use. In LTE
release 10+ those bits are utilized as identifiers of a timing
advance group (TAG). The purpose of this TAG is to enhance
throughput by allowing the UE to connect to multiple serving
eNBs simultaneously that may not be physically collocated
(in release 11+) [40]. The size of this field indicates that a
maximum number of four TAGs is envisioned.
As we have already seen, the TA parameter can be used
to estimate the UE location from a given eNB. If information
were to be provided from multiple eNBs a TA-based location
attack would be able to utilize an unprecedented level of
information, essentially reducing the location problem to one
of standard multilateration.
C. Software Address Space in LTE Networks
Similar to the internet protocol, LTE assigns temporary
identification to users within a given serving cell. This address
or ID is a sixteen bit value called the cell-radio network tem-
porary identifier (C-RNTI) [35]. All transmissions, including
TA issuance, from an eNB (after initial access negotiation) will
carry the C-RNTI of the desired recipient. Therefore, one diffi-
culty which an attacker would need to overcome is mapping a
specific UE to its assigned C-RNTI. In this light, the C-RNTI
can be seen as an attempt at data obfuscation. However, the
quality of the obfuscation provided by the C-RNTI has been
brought into question by other work [12], [43]. Because this
portion of the attack has been previously investigated we
assume the attacker has access to this mapping and focus
instead specifically on the TA.
IV. QUANTIZATION OF A RANDOM VARIABLE
In this section we develop the theoretical framework for
subsequent analysis of the information leakage afforded by
the TA parameter. Specifically, we review the theory associated
with quantization of a RV.
A. The Probability Density of a Quantized Random Variable
Quantization is sometimes regarded as a non-linear opera-
tion making analysis of such non-injective operations difficult.
Here we review the work presented in [13] and highlight that
quantization can be shown to be a linear operation in the RV
signal space.
First, consider an latent RV N with a continuous density
and support V ∈ [a, b] where a and b may not necessarily
be finite. Next, consider a quantization function Q such that
Q : N → N ′ and the density of N ′ is defined as
pN ′(x) =
{∑
n αnδ(x − nτ ) for a < x − nτ < b
0 O.W.
. (2)
Here we make use of δ(·) to represent the Dirac delta function
and α to represent some appropriate scaling parameter. The
relation in (2) can be regarded as a quantized version of N
with quantization bins evenly spaced by τ .
It is well-known that the quantization operation contributes
to the overall noise of the resulting signal. This is represented
by the convolution pN (x) with a uniform distribution pU (x)
with support ∈ [−τ/2, τ/2]. As a first step in defining Q,
consider the result of this convolution
pN (x) ∗ pU (x) = α′ [(x + τ/2)−(x − τ/2)] (3)
where (x − d) is the cumulative distribution function of
pN (x) shifted by some amount d and α′ is a constant which
ensures the Law of Total Probability applies to the result of
the convolution. The second and final step taken in defining
Q is a multiplication of (3) with an impulsion train (Dirac
comb), τ (x), with periodicity τ . It is easily verified that (2)
is the resulting product. This process is presented graphically
in Figure 1.
To see the equivalency of Q to quantization, consider (3) as
the difference of two scaled cumulative distribution functions
(c.f., Figure 1). The product of that density with a Dirac delta
results in
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Fig. 1. The mapping of Q : N −→ N ′ is shown in this figure. The left-most panel shows the original RV with a Gaussian distribution and the right-most
panel shows the result of the mapping superimposed on pN (x) ∗ pU (x). This convolution is shown with a somewhat exaggerated τ in order to highlight the
underlying scaled cumulative distribution functions (c.f., (3)). Note that since the largest Dirac delta occurs at E{pN (x) ∗ pU (x)} and that this corresponds
to the case when the shift variable d = 0.
which is exactly the quantization operation, a direct result of
the definition of a cumulative distribution function.
Note that all steps taken in Q are linear and thus also
commute. Therefore, while the operation is indeed non-linear
in the observations (i.e., the result of a quantized observation
cannot be undone), the operation is linear in signal space.
This will be the subject of further discussion in a subsequent
section.
B. The Characteristic Function of a Quantized Random
Variable
Consider pN (x)
f←→ PN̆ (φ) which are related via the
Fourier transform and PN̆ (φ) is the characteristic func-
tion (CF) of pN (x). Here the quantization function is defined
as Q̆ : N̆ → N̆ ′ with the Fourier equivalent steps that defined
the mapping of the probability densities, 1/τ (φ) ∗ PN (φ) ·




An(φ − n/τ). (5)
Here A(φ) is the result of the product of CFs PN (φ) and
PU (φ). Similar to Q, Q̆ is completely defined by linear
operations.
C. The Effect of Quantization Bin Size
To illuminate the effect of τ on (2) and (5), first consider
the case when τ → 0. The effect on pN ′(x) is to reduce the
separation between impulses proportional to τ . Notice also
that the coefficients an are also functions of τ since a smaller
quantization bin will result in less realizations of that RV
binned to that location. Thus, as τ → 0, an → 0 so that
lim
τ→0 pN
′(x) = pN (x). (6)
The effect is opposite in the Fourier space due primarily to
the relationship τ (x)
f←→ 1/τ (φ). Thus, as τ → 0, the
separation of An−1 and An increases proportionally such that
lim
τ→0PN
′(φ) = PN (φ). (7)
Now consider the case when τ →∞ for (2) and (5). When
the bounds a and b are finite it can be seen that
lim
τ→∞pN ′(x) = δ(x) (8)
since as τ → ∞, a0 → 1 and an → 0, ∀n 
= 0.
This relationship can be extended to any probability density
regardless of whether or not the bounds are finite by again
invoking the Law of Total Probability.
Similarly, let τ →∞ for PN ′(φ). This time the separation
between An−1 and An will go to 0 which follows from the
limit of 1/τ as τ → ∞. Because PN ′(φ) is the sum over
all n, we find
lim
τ→∞PN ′(φ) = 1 (9)
which can be verified to be the Fourier transform pair of (8).
D. The Variance of a Quantized Normal Random Variable
With the behavior of a general quantized RV established,
we now define





as a normal RV with zero mean and some variance σ to sim-
plify the discussion of quantization on variance (c.f., Figure 1).
Next, we use the CF defined in (5) and the definition in (10)








Note that because (10) is zero mean then the case where
k = 2 is equivalent to the variance. Rather than derive a
closed form solution for (11) consider first the case when
τ = 0 such that (7) applies. Using (11) it is easy to verify
that E{η′2} = σ 2. Now let τ = ε where ε is some non-
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in order to estimate the resulting variance with high fidelity
since the term 1/τ in (5) will be arbitrarily large. Stated
another way, we only need to consider a single function A(φ)
from (5), not the entire sum. Using the product rule, the

















Notice that when evaluated at φ = 0 the first and second
derivatives of PN (φ) are 0 and −σ 2 respectively. Also, note
that PU (0) = PN (0) = 1. After applying these observations












Since PU (φ) is concave down ∀τ > 0 at φ = 0 we have that
E{η2} < E{η′2} (15)
where the inequality is strict for a sufficiently small and non-
negative ε.1
Next, consider the case when τ = ∞. Recall from (7) that
PN (φ) = 1. It can be verified that the second derivative is 0
for φ = 0. Thus, when τ is very large the variance of N ′
becomes very small such that the inequality in (15) is reversed
for a sufficiently large τ .
This behavior of the variance as τ → ∞ requires that
τ (x) is not shifted relative to the mean of N . In other words,
d = 0 for τ (x − d) in Q (this is exactly the case shown in
Figure 1). To continue the analysis for some d 
= 0, consider
when d = τ/2 and again let τ → ∞. In this case, we can
approximate PN ′(φ) = 1/2δ(φ′ + τ/2) + 1/2δ(φ′ − τ/2).
It follows then that as τ → ∞, E{η′2} → ∞. It can be
shown that as d increases (or decreases) from d = τ/2 for a
constant τ where d ∈ [0, τ ] the second moment of N ′ returns
to zero. It can further be shown that these variance maxima
occur for values of d = kτ + τ/2 which have corresponding
minima at d = kτ for k ∈ Z. For sufficiently large τ the
second moment then exhibits periodic behavior with period τ .
For convenience define
E{η′2} = β f (d, τ )+ C (16)
where f (·) is a function which is periodic in d with period τ .
The amplitude of f (·) is β and has offset C . It will sub-
sequently be useful to determine the τ for which E{η2} <
C−β/2 (i.e., the value at which the variance of the quantized
RV is guaranteed to be larger than the latent RV ∀d). To find
this range let d = 0, which we have previously seen, is a
minima of (12). To make calculations more tractable we only
consider n ∈ {−1, 0, 1} in (2). Because this function is even,
the value of a−1 = a1 = (−τ/2). The desired bound on
1The value of the second term in (14) can be calculated to a high degree
of accuracy using Sheppard’s corrections [17] when τ ≤ σ [13].
Fig. 2. Here the behavior of the variance of the quantized RV is illuminated
through a numerical study. The variance for a given shift, d, and a quantile
size τ is shown. The abcissa is normalized by τ in order to allow better
comparison amongst the different realizations.
the variance of this probability mass is then straightforward to
compute as
2τ 2(−τ/2)  σ 2 (17)
where equality holds when τ ≈ 3.4σ . Thus, we state
that τ  3.4σ is a necessary and sufficient condition such that
the inequality in (15) holds ∀d .
To better illustrate the relationship between d and E{η′2}
consider Figure 2. Here the shape of (16) is shown for various
values of τ when d ∈ [0, τ ]. Both d and the variance have
been normalized such that it is easier to compare the effect
of τ and d . First, note that as τ increases the amplitude β
also increases. As previously calculated, (16) always stays
above σ 2N for τ  3.4σ . As τ increases beyond this bound
then the minimum value of the variance may drop below
σ 2N for certain d . Second, note that for sufficiently small τ
(e.g., τ < σN the observed variance of η′ is very close to
the the corrected value of the variance of η which agrees
with Sheppards famous corrections [17]. However, as τ grows
above σN , the correction becomes less accurate. Although not
shown in the figure, for larger τ the minimum of (16) will
eventually reach zero and the maximum will grow to infinity.
E. Information Loss in a Quantized Random Variable
Here, following [13], we invoke the analogy of traditional
sampling theory and the Nyquist rate in order to investigate
injectivity in N → Q(N ). Recall that when sampling a
signal the sampled representation is considered representative
of the original continuous-time signal if and only if the
sampling rate is greater than or equal to twice the highest
frequency in the continuous-time signal. If this condition is
met we may say that the sampling operation is injective.
Stated another way, if the former condition is met, we may
perfectly recover the continuous-time signal from the sampled
representation because the sampled representation contains all
of the information of the original signal.
Notice the similarity between sampling and quantization.
The connection is illustrated by the second step in defining Q
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which involved multiplication of an impulsion train with
the convolved latent density. If our goal is to recover the
latent density then the conditions necessary and sufficient
for said recovery is of interest. Widrow’s First Quantization
Theorem (QT1) states that if a RV is bandlimited2 by ±π/τ
then the probabiliy density and CF of the latent RV can be
perfectly recovered [44]. The implications of this theorem
are far reaching; however, many real-world RVs are not
bandlimited. For instance, the normal RV is an example of
an extremely common RV with infinite support. Thankfully,
Widrow also noticed this difficulty and showed in his Second
Quantization Theorem (QT2) that an approximately bandlim-
ited RV (relative to the quantization bin size τ ) can also be
recovered with high fidelity [44]. The recovery of moments is
closely related to Sheppard’s correction, which is shown here
for the second moment [17]




Widrow offers τ ≤ σ as a rule of thumb to define approxi-
mately bandlimited [13]. The efficacy of this rule of thumb is
verified by inspection of Figure 2.
F. A Lower Bound for the Variance of a Quantized Random
Variable
The Cramér-Rao Lower Bound (CRLB) is a well-known
bound for the minimum variance of a parameter, θ ,
estimate [45]. The bound is defined by
Varθ {T } ≥ I−1(θ) (19)
where T is an unbiased estimator of θ and I(θ) is the Fisher
information with respect to θ . Next, we show the CRLB to
hold for quantized data under certain conditions.
Theorem 1: If a latent RV parameterized by θ satisfies
either QT1 or QT2, then
Varθ {T ′} ≥ CRLBθ , τ ∈ [0, 3.4σ ], and ∀d (20)
where T ′ is an unbiased estimator of θ which uses quantized
observations of the RV to estimate θ .
To show this bound consider a normal RV, N(0, σ ), which
is quantized with interval τ = σ and d = 0. If we let τ → 0
then the relationship (7) applies and the proposition becomes
the standard CRLB.
Alternatively, as τ increases from zero (2) can also be seen
as a sum of shifted and scaled Bernoulli pseudo-densities.
We note that each of the sub-densities is not a true probability
density since the resulting sum must satisfy the Law of Total
Probability.
Next, recall that the Fisher information of a Bernoulli RV
is given by I(p) = σ−2b where σ 2b is the variance of a
Bernoulli RV. Therefore, the Fisher information of the quan-








2Widrow uses the term “bandlimited” to define the case when a CF has
a limited support [13]. We adopt this terminology for the remainder of our
exposition.
Fig. 3. A numerical study is shown where the mean value of a latent RV
is estimated with quantized realization of the latent RV. The estimation is
performed for various values of τ and compared against the CRLB for the
latent RV estimation. The study is repeated when there is no shift (d = 0)
and the worst case shift (d = τ/2).
where σ̃ 2n is the pseudo-variance of the nth Bernoulli
pseudo-distribution.
Now we have already shown, and Sheppard’s correction for
the second moment (18) verifies (c.f., also Figure 2), that for
small τ the variance of the quantized signal must be larger than
that of the latent signal. Therefore, the Fisher information of
the observed RV will be smaller than the Fisher information of
the latent RV and the inequality in the theorem will be strict.
Similarly, we have shown that the variance of the observed RV
will be greater than the original for τ  3.4σ so the proposed
bound will hold for τ ∈ [0,∼ 3.4σ ], ∀d .
To verify the theorem is valid consider a normal RV
N (μ, σ 2) where the parameter to be estimated is the mean, μ.
We show the results of a numerical study in Figure 3 in which
we estimate μ via the standard maximum-likelihood method
for various quantile sizes, τ . It can be seen that for any shift in
the quantization bins (∀d) that the resulting root mean square
error (RMSE) lies above the CRLB for τ  3.4σ which
verifies the theorem. Conversely, for values of τ  3.4σ the
results shown in Figure 3 demonstrate that there is no bound
appropriate ∀d .
V. THE TIMING ADVANCE PARAMETER AS A
QUANTIZATIZED RANDOM VARIABLE
In this section we describe the TA as a quantized RV and
derive a MLE for the position estimate of the UE made using
TA measurements.
A. Spatial Quantization in LTE Networks
It is not difficult to see that the TA is a quanitzed RV. First,
the eNB must make a distance estimate based on the time of
arrival of a UE’s uplink frame which we model as a normal
RV [48], [49]. Next, the eNB must determine if the measured
distance necessitates adjustment to the UE’s timing. Because
the eNB can only affect timing adjustment in binary form, the
timing mismatch must be greater than 78.125 meters in order
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Fig. 4. The joint density, p(ξ, d), and marginal density, p(ξ) for the quantized measurement error are obtained numerically and shown here. Since it can be
shown that p(ξ) and p(d) are independent [46], [47] the underlying latent error density can be seen by rotating the joint density such that the d dimension
is not visible. (a) p(ξ, d). (b) p(ξ).
for an adjustment to be issued. Hence, the TA can be seen to
be quantizing the UE’s distance from the serving eNB.
B. A Maximum-Likelihood Estimate and Lower Bound for
Timing Advance Positioning
In order to derive an MLE for a UE position we must first
characterize the distribution of error after quantization p(ξ)
which is shown in Figure 1 and given in (2). However, we have
shown in (2) that the shape of the density is parameterized
by d . Despite this fact, we will further show that it is also
appropriate to model all possible p(ξ |d) with a single density.
To begin, let p(ξ, d) be the joint density of the error
in the distance estimate ξ and annular offset d . Next, let
p(ξ) ∼ N (0, σ 2) be a marginal density of p(ξ, d). This
choice of a distribution models the continuous error associated
with distance measurement and is widely accepted in the
literature [48], [49]. To arrive at p(ξ |d), contrast the effect
on τ (η − d) of when a UE is positioned in the center of a
TA annulus (d = 0) with when a UE is on a TA boundary
(d = τ/2). Because p(ξ |d) = pN ′(η), it appears that p(ξ)
and p(d) should be dependent since the shape of p(ξ |d) is
completely dependent on d . However, it has been shown that if
the conditions of QT1 or QT2 are satisfied then p(ξ) and p(d)
are, in fact, independent [46], [47].
The implications of this paradoxical independence on the
TA as a RV is that regardless of where the UE is located within
a TA annulus (i.e., annular offset), the error can be modeled
with the same density assuming the conditions of QT1 or QT2
can be met. This is an important fact to establish in order
to make the MLE tractable. Field measurements have shown
that the latent standard deviation in distance measurement
is ∼50 m [33]. It has also been shown previously that the
TA quantization bin size is 78.125 m wide. Therefore, for
LTE TA-based positioning τ ≈ 1.5σ , which we propose is
sufficiently close to satisfy the conditions of QT2 and well
within the acceptable range for the Theorem 1 to apply.
Contrast this with the GSM quantile size of 550 m. Assuming
the latent GSM measurement error is the same as in LTE,
τ ≈ 5.5σ and neither Theorem 1 or QT2 apply. Thus, LTE
marks a significant statistical shift in what we are able to do
with the TA parameter.
The shape of the the joint density is presented in the top
panel of Figure 4 when the latent density is normal. When
the joint density is rotated such that the d dimension is not
visible, as in the bottom panel, one can observe the latent
density. If the value of d is completely unknown it would
be reasonably modeled as a uniform RV. Thus, by integrating∫
d p(ξ |d)p(d) we find p(ξ) ∼ N(0, σ 2). However, because d
and ξ are independent
∫
d p(ξ |d)p(d) = p(ξ)
∫
d p(d) = p(ξ)
therefore p(ξ) ∼ N (0, σ 2) regardless of the shape of p(d).
For an MLE to TA-based positioning we can now formu-
late the problem for a set of distance measurements, d̂ =
[d̂1, d̂2, . . . , d̂N ]T , from N eNBs as
p̂ = arg max
p
p(d̂|d) (22)
where p̂ = [x̂, ŷ]T is the position estimate and d =
[d1, d2, . . . , dN ]T is a vector of true distances. The solution
to this program is well-known as [48]
N∑
i=1





(di − d̂i )(y − yi )
σ 2i di
= 0. (24)
Solving (23) and (24) directly involves an exhaustive search
in p. However, numerical solutions have been proposed that
have been shown to be statistically efficient (e.g., [50]).
Theorem 1 then states that the mean squared error (MSE)
in the position estimate is bounded by
Var{p̂} ≥ I−1ξ (p) = CRLBθ (25)
where I−1ξ (p) is the Fisher information matrix given by [48]
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and the bracketed subscripts indicate the matrix index. For the
case of multilateration-based position estimation and normal






























Thus, in this section we have proposed a lower bound under
the condition that τ  3.4σ and a corresponding MLE.
VI. CELLULAR SYNCHRONIZATION ASSISTED
REFINEMENT
A previously introduced algorithm, Cellular Synchroniza-
tion Assisted Refinement (CeSAR), has been proposed to
increase the accuracy of TA-based positioning [32]. This
method requires a sensor in the serving cell of the UE to
be located. The CeSAR procedure, outlined in Algorithm 1,
further requires that the position of the sensor and the serving
eNB be known a priori as well as the UE C-RNTI.3 The
essence of the procedure is that the TA contains two pieces of
information: the distance of the UE to the serving eNB and
the UE’s uplink transmit time. If a local sensor knows the
UE’s uplink transmit time, t , and can record the time when
the UE observes the transmission, t ′, then the distance from
the sensor to the UE can be determined. This effectively adds
another dimension to the system of equations defined by d̂.
Besides improving positioning accuracy, CeSAR has several
strengths:
1) It can be performed completely passively. Therefore,
during a location attack the sensor cannot be detected
from electromagnetic emanations.
2) Strategic positioning of the sensor can overcome geo-
metric dilution of precision [48] in eNBs arranged dis-
advantageously. This is a strength that will be shown in
Section VII to be able to dramatically improve accuracy.
3) The sensor need not be complex. The advent of software
defined radio (SDR) has put this type of attack within
reach of reasonably skilled actors. Further, SDR tech-
nology has significantly lowered the monetary cost of
entry to this type of exploitation.
Referring now to Algorithm 1, we give a detailed account
of the procedure. First, the sensor listens for the primary
and secondary search signals from a serving eNB (2-4).
This is a necessary step for synchronizing itself to the base
station thus giving it the ability to decode cell data. Next,
the sensor decodes packets that it receives until it finds the
target C-RNTI (5-8). Once a downlink frame being sent to the
target UE has been identified (8), the associated TA is striped
from the MAC CE and converted to a distance (9). If there
is more than one serving eNB (N > 1) this process can be
repeated. Simultaneously, the TA is used to estimate the target
UE’s uplink transmission time (10). With this information, the
sensor can measure the propagation delay from the UE to the
3Methods for mapping the C-RNTI to a UE are detailed in [32].
Algorithm 1 Cellular Synchronization Assisted Refinement
1: procedure CESAR(peN B , psensor ,target C-RNTI)
2: function PSS/SSS SYNC()
3: sensor←eNB downlink frame timing
4: end function
5: repeat
6: x ←observed C-RNTI
7: until
8: x == target C-RNTI
9: d̂i ← TA×78.125 m
10: t ← est_Tx_Time(TA)
11: t ′ ← observed uplink burst time
12: t ← t ′ − t
13: d̂ ′ = t · c
14: d̂← [d̂1, . . . , d̂N , d̂ ′]T
15: p̂ = arg min p(d̂|d)
16: end procedure
sensor and convert that to a distance measurement (11-13).
This additional distance measurement is added to the distance
measurements obtained from the N serving eNBs and used to
find a MLE via previously discussed means (14-15).
VII. RESULTS
In this section we present numerical studies done with
synthetic and real-world data collected in actual LTE network
deployments. This section will show that the proposed MLE
agrees with the lower bound derived in Section IV and provide
expected accuracies for TA-based location attacks.
A. Method of Maximum-Likelihood Estimation
As was mentioned in Section IV, the exact MLE associated
with this type of positioning is not available in closed form and
requires an exhaustive search to solve exactly [48]. Despite
this, approximate solutions to (23) and (24) that have been
shown to be efficient have been proposed (e.g., [50], [51]).
In this work we solve (23) and (24) by iterative numerical
search techniques. First, the entire serving area is searched
to maximize (22) at some course granularity. Second, the
numerical search area is moved to the coarse estimate and
the granularity is reduced to approximately 2.5 meters. The
refined area is again searched for a local maximum in order
to produce a refined estimate.
We acknowledge the computational burden imposed by this
method of numerical estimation, but adopt it in order to
divorce the results from idiosyncrasies associated with other
existing approximate methods. In this way, we believe the
results are displayed in a form most appropriate for interpre-
tation in the context of the preceding analysis. We also note
that more computationally pragmatic methods could easily be
adapted to this localization attack.
Since the data required to formulate (22) is readily avail-
able to a properly equipped eavesdropper, we note that
the computational cost of the attack is completely decided
by the method of solving (22), which may be nontrivial.4
4We further note that the computational burden is levied on the sensor and
does not affect the operation of the network or UE.
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Fig. 5. Here the experimental setup is presented. In all studies there are
N = 3 eNBs arranged on a circle centered on the UE of some radius r . The
eNBs all share an angular separation of θ . When the CeSAR sensor is used,
it is positioned at θ = 3π/4 also with radius r .
Besides the proposed method, some available options include
a gradient descent algorithm [48], linearization of the objec-
tive [52], and the iterative approach used in [51]. While these
methods have been shown to work well in practice, they are
not guaranteed to find the global solution to (22) and may
not be statistically efficient. The local optimization problem is
further exacerbated when there is no prior knowledge of the
UE location since the success of some of the aforementioned
algorithms is dependent on proper initialization.
The computational cost of the proposed scheme is depen-
dent on the required granularity and the sizes of the initial and
refined tracking area. Because it performs an exhaustive search
of both the coarse (mc × nc) and refined (mr × nr ) tracking
areas, there is a direct computational relationship to the
number of potential locations L = (mc×nc)+ (mr×nr ). The
computational cost of solving the objective in (22) can thus
be said to scale with O(L). If each individual tracking area
size is considered, and each tracking area is square, then the
computational cost associated with solving (22) can be further
expressed as O(m2c +m2r ). We note that the proposed method
is not exact, but approximate to the granularity specified by
the refined tracking area.
B. Empirical and Synthetic Studies
The experimental setup for subsequent numerical studies
is presented in Figure 5. The UE victim is placed at the
origin and three serving eNBs are considered in order to
simulate future heterogeneous network deployments. Because
the CRLB is solely a function of angles to the target and
not distance (c.f., (27)) the serving eNBs are all placed at
some arbitrary distance, r , from the UE. The eNBs share an
angular separation of θ ∈ {π/4, π/5, 3π/20, π/10}. Because
in an actual LTE network deployment the number of serving
eNBs and σN do not vary significantly, we show positioning
accuracy relative to infrastructure geometry by iterating the
geometry through the various values of θ . In line with field
measurements [33], the observed σ ≈ 50 meters for all serving
eNBs. Also, following (1), the latent data is quantized by
τ = 78.125 m before producing a distance estimate.
Initially, we do not consider a CeSAR augmented attack.
However, later the CeSAR procedure is used to amplify the
attack to show the theoretical benefit. For these simulations,
the CeSAR sensor is placed on the same circle of arbitrary
distance as the eNBs, but with a fixed angular separation from
the abscissa of θ = 3π/4. In this way, we demonstrate how
Fig. 6. The results of the numerical studies in terms of RMSE are presented
in this figure. Simulated and real-world error data are presented for the
geometries presented in Figure 5 alongside the lower bound presented in
Section IV.
strategic placement of the sensor can negate the geometric
effects of poor geometry in the existing network infrastructure.
For simulated sensor data the unobserved σ = 10 meters and
the resulting estimate is quantized by 12 meters in line with
a sample rate of 25 MSps.
This simulated data is also compared with acutal TA data
collected in an actual LTE network deployment in downtown
Baltimore, Maryland [33]. This error data is superimposed
on the simulated eNB locations in order to compare actual
realizations of TA error with the assumptions made in simula-
tion. In real-world implementation each eNB will have some
specific bias which results in the error distribution being non-
zero. We assume that this bias is measured and known a
priori such that the position estimate p̂ is unbiased. For the
CeSAR sensor, actual error data is generated through a radio
ranging experiment done in SDR. In this experiment a receiver
estimates a transmitter’s distance by measuring the time of
flight of a 1023 bit pseudo-random binary phase shift keyed
sequence with a sample rate of 20 MSps. The estimate is made
by means of a matched filter. Like the TA error data, this data
is superimposed on the simulated CeSAR sensor location.
The results of these studies, with and without CeSAR aug-
mentation, are presented in Figure 6 alongside the theoretical
lower bound derived in Section IV for each scenario. First, we
observe close agreement with the results and the theoretical
lower bound further validating the analysis. Second, we see
close agreement between the simulated data and real-world
data. This agreement validates assumptions we have made
regarding the nature of the data in general.
Next, we note the trend of localization accuracy. When θ is
small and CeSAR is not used to augment the position estimate
the RMSE is relatively high. As θ increases to its maximum
value, the RMSE goes down. This agrees with the trend
predicted by (27). Thus, the existing network geometry is seen
as a strong influence on the performance of the attack. In this
study the accuracy varies on the order of 50 meters depending
on the infrastructure layout. However, when the CeSAR sensor
is included and strategically placed, the dependence of the
attack on network geometry can be essentially negated thus
ROTH et al.: ON LOCATION PRIVACY IN LTE NETWORKS 1367
illustrating one of the main strengths of CeSAR mentioned in
Section VI.
Finally, we demonstrate with real and synthetic data that
accuracies on the order of 40 meters are possible. This simulta-
neously highlights the vulnerability of the LTE signaling plane
and the power of this type of attack and the method of CeSAR
augmentation.
VIII. VULNERABILITY MITIGATION
Here, we suggest three ways of mitigating the location
privacy vulnerability presented in this paper.
Most obviously, the vulnerability could be mitigated by
encrypting the TA parameter. In this way, the TA would not
be available to a third party while still retaining uplink timing
control at the eNB. Without the TA, a would-be attacker
would not be able to identify an eNB-UE distance, nor would
they be privy to the target UE’s uplink scheduling. Therefore,
neither traditional TA-based location attacks nor the CeSAR
augmented attack would be possible.
A second method of vulnerability mitigation would be to
encrypt uplink resource scheduling. If this means of miti-
gation is used, an attacker would not be able to augment
a location-based attack with the CeSAR method. However,
the attacker would still have the information necessary to
execute a traditional TA-based attack. Thus, their precision
would be reduced (c.f., Figure 3), but the target UE position
could still be estimated. While encrypting the TA completely
mitigates timing-based location attacks, additionally encrypt-
ing the uplink resource scheduling provides a defense-in-depth
appropriate for securing user location privacy.
Because the TA and uplink resource grant scheduling is
currently done in the clear presumably to reduce UE computa-
tional burden and prioritize data throughput, it should be noted
that shifting to an architecture which requires more encrypted
data could degrade user quality of service. We therefore
offer an alternative which requires no encryption: timing and
scheduling semi-persistence. Currently, resource scheduling
and timing management is highly dynamic and done on a
frame-by-frame basis [35] in order to exploit the time-varying
nature of an individual user channel. However, by reducing the
rate at which these parameters are updated, the protocol makes
this sensitive signaling less available to a third party. The
level of persistence would need to be commensurate with user
mobility. In other words, a stationary user should receive less
resource scheduling5 and timing updates than a mobile user.
While this option would not completely protect a user from a
location attack (especially highly mobile users), it would strike
a balance between data throughput and privacy protection.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown that the LTE signaling plane
is vulnerable to exploitation of the TA parameter. This vulner-
ability is enabled by the architectural evolution from earlier
protocols, such as GSM, which leave the signaling plane open
to observation.
5Semi-persistent scheduling is already offered by the current LTE
standard [35].
To quantify said vulnerability we have derived a lower
bound and corresponding MLE which can be used to bench-
mark the accuracy afforded by TA-based positioning. This
bound has been verified through numerical studies utilizing
both synthetic and real-world data. A corollary is that popular
conceptions of the nature of TA data has been verified through
the preceding analysis and studies.
We further investigated the possibility of augmenting a
TA-based attack with the CeSAR method and showed that it
can simultaneously improve positioning accuracy and sedate
the effects of poor network infrastructure geometry. The
confluence of its passive nature with more ready access to
SDR technology make it a particularly potent threat. In our
studies we presented average accuracies as tight as 40 meters
as possible.
Finally, we have proposed suggestions for mitigating the
aforementioned vulnerability to location privacy.
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